

# Computational Semantics

- FOPL: a definition
- Some common problems in semantics:
  - simple predicates
  - quantifier scope
  - donkeys
  - marrying norwegians
- Other semantic formalisms:
  - Discourse Representation Theory (DRT)
  - Update Semantics
  - Dynamic Predicate Logic
  - Situation Theory

# First Order Predicate Logic

- atoms:  $a, b, c, \dots$
- predicates:  $predA/2, predB/2, predC/1$
- basic statements:  $predA(a, b), predB(b, c), predC(b)$
- compound statements:
  - $A \wedge B$
  - $A \vee B$
  - $\neg A$
  - $A \rightarrow B \equiv \neg A \vee B$
- quantifiers:
  - $\forall X A$
  - $\exists Y A$

# First Order Predicate Logic: semantics

Model theoretic semantics

- basic statements:
  - $predA(a, b)$  is true if  $\llbracket pred0 \rrbracket^M (\llbracket a \rrbracket^M, \llbracket b \rrbracket^M)$
- compound statements:
  - $A \wedge B$  true if  $\llbracket A \rrbracket^M$  and  $\llbracket B \rrbracket^M$
  - $A \vee B$  true if  $\llbracket A \rrbracket^M$  or  $\llbracket B \rrbracket^M$
  - $\neg A$  true if  $A$  is false
  - $A \rightarrow B$  true if  $\llbracket A \rrbracket^M$  is false or  $\llbracket B \rrbracket^M$
- quantifiers:
  - $\forall X A$  is true if for all bindings of  $X$  in  $A$ ,  $\llbracket A \rrbracket^M$  is true
  - $\exists Y A$  is true if there exists one binding of  $Y$  in  $A$ , such that  $\llbracket A \rrbracket^M$  is true

## Some examples

- $actor(HarrisonFord)$   
“Harrison Ford is an actor”
- $\exists X actor(X) \wedge director(X)$   
“Someone is a actor and a directory”
- quantifier scope
  - $\forall X \exists Y (man(X) \rightarrow woman(Y) \wedge loves(X, Y))$
  - $\exists Y \forall X (man(X) \rightarrow woman(Y) \wedge loves(X, Y))$

## A semantic check list

- simple predicates:
  - “John walks”  $\rightsquigarrow walk(j)$
  - “A man walks”  $\rightsquigarrow \exists X(man(X) \wedge walk(X))$
  - “A man walks. He talks”  $\rightsquigarrow$
  - $\exists X(man(X) \wedge walk(X) \wedge talk(X))$
- quantifier scope:
  - “Every man loves a woman”  $\rightsquigarrow$
  - $\forall X \exists Y(man(X) \rightarrow woman(Y) \wedge loves(X, Y)) \vee$
  - $\exists Y \forall X(man(X) \rightarrow woman(Y) \wedge loves(X, Y))$
- Quasi-Logical Form:
  - SRI (UK) Alshawi, don’t evaluate scopes
  - leave them unresolved

# Donkeys

“Every man who owns a donkey beats it”

□ possible translations

- $VX((man(X) \wedge \exists Y(donkey(Y) \wedge owns(X, Y)))) \rightarrow beats(X, Y))$
- mal-formed as final  $Y$  outside scope of  $\exists Y$
- $VX\exists Y((man(X) \wedge donkey(Y) \wedge owns(X, Y)) \rightarrow beats(X, Y))$
- true in model  $man(a), own(a, b) donkey(b), cat(c)$
- $\exists YVX((man(X) \wedge donkey(Y) \wedge owns(X, Y)) \rightarrow beats(X, Y))$
- A single donkey jointly owned
- $VXVY((man(X) \wedge donkey(Y) \wedge owns(X, Y)) \rightarrow beats(X, Y))$
- the most likely meaning

But the most likely meaning has a Universal for an indefinite

## Discourse Representation Theory


Hans Kamp (1981)

Johnson and Klein 1986 “Discourse, anaphora and parsing”, COLING 86 (Bonn).

Kamp and Reyle 1993.

Discourse Representation Structure (DRS)


A man walks  $\rightsquigarrow$



- Discourse markers
- Conditions

## Indefinites in DRT

DRT offers a uniform treatment of indefinite NPs whether within the scope of a universal or not.



## Summary

### Discourse Representation Theory

- Every in DRSS
  - ⇒ relation between sub-DRSS
- Accessibility of markers
- Donkey anaphora
- DRT offers a uniform treatment of indefinites,

## Marrying Norwegians

“Mary wants to marry a Norwegian”

- Mary knows who her future husband is and he is from Norway

$$\text{---} \quad \exists X \exists Y ( \text{marry}(X) \quad \wedge \quad \text{norwegian}(Y) \quad \wedge \quad \text{wants\_to\_marry}(X, Y) )$$

- Mary likes Norway and want so to live there so she want so marry someone, though doesn't know who, who is norwegian.
- “Mary wants to marry a millionaire”

Need higher order semantics to represent this

## **Situation Semantics**

### Naming things

- All basic logics require grounding in semantics
- Meaning is defined for each part
- Cannot refer to themselves
- “The set of all sets” (Russell)
  - cannot give a constructive definition
- Need to introduce:
  - fixed point semantics
  - Non-well founded set theory (Peter Aczel)
  - Antifoundation axiom

## Other “famous” sentences

- John seeks a unicorn.
- John sees Mary walk and Bill walk or not walk.
- Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
- Every representative of a company saw most samples.
- Mary gave her mother flowers and so did Jane.